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Abstract— End-user privacy in smart meter measurements
is a well-known challenge in the smart grid. The solutions
offered thus far have been tied to specific technologies such
as batteries or assumptions on data usage. Existing solutions
have also not quantified the loss of benefit (utility) that results
from any such privacy-preserving approach. Using tools from
information theory, a new framework is presented that abstracts
both the privacy and the utility requirements of smart meter
data. This leads to a novel privacy-utility tradeoff problem
with minimal assumptions that is tractable. Specifically for a
stationary Gaussian Markov model of the electricity load, it is
shown that the optimal utility-and-privacy preserving solution
requires filtering out frequency components that are low in power,
and this approach appears to encompass most of the proposed
privacy approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information collection and dissemination, some of it using
smart meters, are critical to the smart grid. But information
about electricity consumption that is collected and harnessed
for a more efficient and multi-faceted grid may be used for
purposes beyond electricity consumption, thereby making it
potentially dangerous to individual privacy. The privacy con-
sequences of smart grid development are hard to understand
for two principal reasons: (i) the full range of technological
capabilities and information extraction possibilities have not
been laid out, and (ii) our concept of privacy in this space
are yet poorly defined and shifting. Smart meters are an
indispensable enabler in the context of smart grids, which
deploy advanced information and communication technology
to control the electrical grid.
The main motivations for high-resolution energy usage data
collection are to forecast load demand and to provide opti-
mized service to consumers in the form of pricing structure [1].
An electricity provider can use this information to facilitate
more efficient network management, peak load reduction, load
shaping, and a number of other such uses. However, it has been
known for some time that the information of appliance use can
be reconstructed from the overall real-time load using libraries
of appliance load signatures that could be matched to signals
found within the noise of a customer’s aggregated electricity
use and a large amount of detail concerning customer usage
habits can be discerned [2]. [1] cites a list of privacy-sensitive
characteristics that may be inferred from electricity load data
ranging from house occupancy to personal habits and routines.
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The NIST Smart Grid Interoperability Panel has also un-
derlined risk to privacy of personal behavior because new
types of energy use data are created and communicated by
smart meters, such as unique electric signatures for consumer
electronics and appliances, thereby opening up further oppor-
tunities for general invasion of privacy. [3] suggest that there
will always “be the temptation to sell such information such as
energy usage or appliance data, either in identifiable customer
level, anonymized or aggregate form to third parties such as
marketers seeking commercial gain.”. Thus, a desired feature
of privacy design in the smart grid would be “positive-sum,
not zero-sum” in that it seeks to accommodate all legitimate
interests and objectives in a fair manner without completely
sacrificing privacy for utility or vice-versa.
A typical approach to privacy in smart meter data is
aggregation along dimensions of space (using neighborhood
gateways, e.g. [4]), time (using battery storage, e.g. [5]), or
precision (by noise addition, e.g. [6]). These solutions seek
to support utility and privacy in different ways; however,
they do not have a robust theoretical basis for both privacy
and utility. Such a basis is important for several reasons.
First, a theoretical abstraction allows us to recast the problem
in a technology-independent manner – we need a privacy
framework that not only addresses the capabilities of current
non-intrusive load monitoring (NALM) techniques but is also
extensible to future ones. Second, a theoretical framework
enables us to examine the costs of lost privacy against the
benefits of data dissemination, namely, the tradeoff between
privacy and utility. It would be desirable to give each customer
the ability to decide that tradeoff and also to give the electricity
provider the ability to incentivize the customer to participate
in such a bargain by offering interesting points of tradeoff.
Finally, a theoretical framework for privacy and utility may
expose points of tradeoff that are unexpected.
We propose a general theoretical framework that brings
most current treatments of the privacy-utility tradeoff into a
single model – it enables us to look at a spectrum of abstract
privacy-utility choices and enables us to find maximal points
on such a tradeoff curve. It also suggests new possible ways
of achieving this tradeoff that have not been considered thus
far.
What we have found is that suppressing low power com-
ponents would be consistent with intuitive notions of privacy
in smart meter data. At the same time, our utility constraints
guarantee that the bulk of the energy consumption information
in the load measurements is retained in the revealed data. This
suggests that it may indeed be possible to reveal significant
energy consumption information without also revealing a lot of
personal information and the resulting tradeoff can be tuned.
This would be an interesting avenue for further exploration.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we outline
current approaches to smart meter privacy. In Section III, we
develop our model, metrics, and the privacy-utility tradeoff
framework and illustrate our results in Section IV.
II. RELATED WORK
The advantages and usefulness of smart meters in general is
examined in a number of papers; see for example [7] and the
references therein. [5] presents a pioneering view of privacy
of smart meter information: the authors identify the need
for privacy in a home’s load signature as being an inference
violation (resulting from load signatures of home appliances)
rather than an identity violation (i.e. loss of anonymity).
Accordingly, they propose home electrical power routing using
rechargeable batteries and alternate power sources to moderate
the effects of load signatures. They also propose three different
privacy metrics: relative entropy, clustering classification, and
a correlation/regression metric. However they do not propose
any formal utility metrics to quantify the utility-privacy trade-
off.
Recently, [8] proposes additional protection through the
use of a trusted escrow service, along with randomized time
intervals between the setup of attributable and anonymous data
profiles at the smart meter. [9] shows, somewhat surprisingly,
that even without a priori knowledge of household activities or
prior training it is possible to extract complex usage patterns
from smart meter data such as residential occupancy and
social activities very accurately using off-the-shelf statistical
methods. [4] and [9] propose privacy-enhancing designs using
neighborhood-level aggregation and cryptographic protocols to
communicate with the energy supplier without compromising
the privacy of individual homes. However, escrow services and
neighborhood gateways support only restricted query types and
do not completely solve the problem of trustworthiness. [10]
presents a formal state transition diagram-based analysis of the
privacy afforded by the rechargeable battery model proposed
in [5]. However, [10] does not offer a comparable model of
utility to compare the risks of information leakage with the
benefits of the information transmitted.
In, [6] the authors present a method of providing differential
privacy over aggregate queries modeling smart meter measure-
ments as time-series data from multiple sources containing
temporal correlations. While their approach has some similar-
ity to ours in terms of time-series data treatment, their method
does not seem generalizable to arbitrary query types. On the
other hand, [11] introduces the notion of partial information
hiding by introducing uncertainty about individual values in a
time series by perturbing them. Our method is a more general
approach to time series data perturbation that guarantees that
the perturbation cannot be eliminated by averaging.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
The primary challenge in characterizing the privacy-utility
tradeoffs for smart meter data is creating the right abstraction
– we need a principled approach that provides quantitative
measures of both the amount of information leaked as well as
the utility retained, does not rely on any assumptions of data
mining algorithms, and provides a basis for a negotiated level
of benefit for both consumer and supplier [3]. [10] provides
the beginnings of such a model – they assume that in every
sampling time instant, the net load is either 0 or 1 power unit
represented by the smart meter readings Xk, k = 1, 2, ..., are
a discrete-time sequence of binary independent and identically
distributed values. They model the battery-based filter of [5]
as a stochastic transfer function that outputs a binary sequence
Xˆk that tells the electricity provider whether the home is
drawing power or not at any given moment. The amount
of information leaked by the transfer function is defined to
be the mutual information rate I(X ; Xˆ) between the random
variables X and Xˆ . By modeling the battery charging policy
as a 2-state stochastic transition machine, they show that there
exist battery policies that result in less information leakage
than from the deterministic charging policy of [5]. Though
[10] does not provide a general utility function to go with
the chosen privacy function and the modeling assumptions are
extremely simplistic, it nevertheless provides a good starting
point for our framework.
In our model, we assume that the load measurements are
sampled (at an appropriate frequency) from a smart meter,
that they are real-valued, and can be correlated (models
the temporal memory of both appliances and human usage
patterns). Rather than assume any specific transfer function,
we assume an abstract transfer function which maps the input
load measurements X into an output sequence Xˆ . As in [10],
we assume a mutual information rate as a metric for privacy
leakage; however, we allow for the fact that a large space of
(unknown to us) inferences can be made from the meter data –
we model the inferred data as a random variable Y correlated
with the measurement variable X . Thus, the privacy leakage
is the mutual information between Y and Xˆ . We also provide
an abstract utility function which measures the fidelity of the
output sequence Xˆ by limiting the Euclidean distance (mean
square error) between X and Xˆ . Using these abstractions
and tools from the theory of rate distortion we are able to
meet all our requirements for a general but tractable privacy-
utility framework: the privacy and utility requirements provide
opposing constraints that expose a spectrum of choices for
trading off privacy for utility and vice-versa.
A. Model
We write xt, t = 1, 2, . . . , n, to denote the sampled load
measurements from a smart meter. In general, xt are complex
valued corresponding to the real and reactive measurements
and are typically vectors for multi-phase systems [2]. For
simplicity and ease of presentation, we model the meter mea-
surements as a sequence of real-valued scalars (for example,
such a model applies to two-phase 120 V appliances for which
one of the two phase components is zero).
For appropriately small sampling intervals, the smart me-
ter time-series data that result from sampling the underly-
ing continuous-time continuous-amplitude processes can be
viewed as being generated by a random source with memory.
The memory models the continuity and the effect of both
short-term and long-term correlations in the load measure-
ments. The short term correlations typically model the effect
of the set of appliances in use over the said duration while
the long term correlations model the long term power usage
pattern of the human user. We model the continuous valued
smart meter data as a sequence . . . , Xk−1, Xk, Xk+1, . . ., of
random variables Xk ∈ X , −∞ < k < ∞, generated by a
stationary continuous valued source with memory. Specifically,
we model the continuous valued discrete-time smart meter data
as a sequence . . . , Xk−1, Xk, Xk+1, . . ., of Gaussian random
variables Xk ∈ X , k = 0,±1, ..., generated by a stationary
Gaussian source with memory captured via the autocorrelation
function
cXX (m) = E [XkXk+m] ,m = 0,±1,±2, .... (1)
The assumption of normal distribution for total load is a
simplification from empirical observations [12] that the power
consumption pattern of a typical appliance in the on state is
approximately Gaussian.
B. Utility and Privacy Metrics
Since continuous amplitude sources cannot be transmitted
losslessly over finite capacity links, a sampled sequence of
n load measurements Xn is compressed before transmission.
In general, however, even if the sampled measurements were
quantized a priori, i.e., take values in a discrete alphabet, there
may be a need to perturb (distort) the data in some way to
guarantee a measure of privacy. However, such a perturbation
also needs to maintain a desired level of fidelity.
Intuitively, utility of the perturbed data is high if any
function computed on it yields results similar to those from
the original data; thus, the utility is highest when there is
no perturbation and goes to zero when the perturbed data is
completely unrelated to the original. Accordingly, our utility
metric is an appropriately chosen average ‘distance’ distortion
function between the original and the perturbed data.
Privacy, on the other hand, is maximized when the perturbed
data is completely independent of the original. Our privacy
metric measures the difficulty of inferring any private infor-
mation of the data collector’s choice, defined as a sequence
{Yk} of random variables Yk ∈ Y , -∞ < k < ∞, which
is correlated with and can be inferred from the revealed
data. The random sequence {Yk} for all k along with the
joint distribution pXnY n mathematically captures the space
of all inferences that can be made from the measurements.
We quantify the resulting privacy loss as a result of revealing
perturbed data via the mutual information between the two
data sequences.
As an aside, we note here that our model of privacy is
between a single user (household) and the electricity provider.
It does not consider the leakage possibilities of comparing the
perturbed data from two or more different users. On the other
hand it can address the possibility of side-information such as
income level of the user that may cause further information
leakage. If we know the statistics of the side-information that
we can incorporate the possible leakage into the model and
derive the consequent modified privacy-utility tradeoff. For
simplicity we ignore the side-information aspect in this paper.
C. Perturbation: Encoding and Decoding
Encoding: We assume that a meter collects n ≫ 1 mea-
surements in an interval of time prior to communication and
that n is large enough to capture the source’s memory. The
encoding function is then a mapping of the resulting source
sequence Xn = (X1 X2 X3 . . . Xn), where Xk ∈ R, for all
k = 1, 2, . . . , n, to an index Wn ∈ Wn given by
FE : X
n →Wn ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,Mn} (2)
where each index represents a quantized sequence.
Decoding: The decoder (at the data collector) computes an
output sequence Xˆn =
(
Xˆ1 Xˆ2 Xˆ3 . . . Xˆn
)
, Xˆk ∈ R, for
all k, using the decoding function
FD :W → Xˆ
n. (3)
The encoder is chosen such that the input and output sequences
achieve a desired utility given by an average distortion con-
straint
Dn =
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
[(
Xk − Xˆk
)2]
(4)
and a constraint on the information leakage about the desired
sequence {Yk} from the revealed sequence
{
Xˆk
}
is quantified
via the leakage function
Ln =
1
n
I
(
Y n; Xˆn
)
(5)
where E [·] denotes the expectation over the joint distribution
of Xn and Xˆn given by pXXˆ (xn, xˆn) = PnXn (xn) pt(xˆn|xn)
where pt(xˆn|xn) is a conditional pdf on xˆn given xn. The
mean-square error (MSE) distortion function chosen in (4) is
typical for Gaussian distributed real-valued data as a measure
of the fidelity of the perturbation (encoding).
Note that Dn and Ln are functions of the number of mea-
surements n and for stationary sources converge to limiting
values [13]. Let D and L denote the corresponding limiting
values for utility and privacy, respectively, i.e.,
D ≡ lim
n→∞
Dn and L ≡ lim
n→∞
Ln. (6)
D. Utility-Privacy Tradeoff Region
Formally, the utility-privacy tradeoff region T is defined as
follows.
Definition 1: The smart meter utility-privacy tradeoff re-
gion T is the set of all (D,L) pairs for which there ex-
ists a coding scheme given by (2) and (3) with parameters
(n,Mn, Dn+ǫ, Ln+ǫ) satisfying (4) and (5) for n sufficiently
large and ǫ > 0.
Rate-Distortion-Leakage: The above utility-privacy tradeoff
problem does not explicitly bound the number Mn of encoded
(quantized) sequences. An explicit constraint on
Mn ≤ 2
n(Rn+ǫ) (7)
results in a rate-distortion-leakage (RDL) tradeoff problem for
which the feasible region is defined as follows. Let R =
limn→∞ (logMn) /n.
Definition 2: The rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff region
RRDL is the set of all (R,D,L) tuples for which there exists
a coding scheme given by (2), (3), and (7) with parameters
(n,Mn, Dn+ǫ, Ln+ǫ) satisfying (4) and (5) for n sufficiently
large and ǫ > 0. The function λ (D) quantifies the minimal
leakage achievable for a feasible distortion D such that the set
of all (R,D, λ(D)) are the boundary points of RRDL.
Theorem 1: T = {(D,L) : (R,D,L) ∈ RRDL, D ∈ [0,
Dmax], L ≥ λ (D)} .
Proof sketch: The crux of our argument is the fact that
for any feasible utility vector D, choosing the minimum rate
R (D,λ(D)), ensures that the least amount of information is
revealed about the source via the reconstructed variable. This
in turn ensures that the minimal leakage λ(D) of the correlated
sequence Y n is achieved for that utility. For the same utility
constraint, since such a rate requirement is not a part of the
utility-privacy model, the resulting maximal privacy achieved
is at most as large as that in RRDL.
E. Rate-Distortion-Leakage Tradeoff
We now use Theorem 1 to precisely quantify the utility-
privacy tradeoff via the RDL tradeoff region. The proof is
a direct generalization of the RDL region for memoryless
sources (see, for example, [14], [15]), and hence, is omitted
for lack of space. Intuitively, the proof follows from upper
and lower bounding the minimal communication rate R as a
function of D and L and the minimal leakage rate λ as a
function of D.
Theorem 2: The rate-distortion-leakage region for a source
with memory subject to distortion and leakage constraints in
(4) and (5) is given by the rate-distortion and minimal leakage
functions
R(D,L) = lim
n→∞
inf
p(xn,yn)p(xˆn|xn)
1
n
I
(
Xn; Xˆn
)
(8)
λ(D) = lim
n→∞
inf
p(xn,yn)p(xˆn|xn)
1
n
I
(
Y n; Xˆn
)
. (9)
The utility-privacy tradeoff is captured by λ(D) which is the
minimal privacy leakage for a desired distortion (utility) D.
Remark 1: The Markov relationship Y n − Xn − Xˆn is
captured via the set of all distributions in (8) and (9) which
minimize R(D,L) and λ(D).
Corollary 1: For Yk = Xk, for all k, i.e., for the case
in which the actual measurements need to be undisclosed,
λ(D) = R(D,L) = R(D) where R(D) is the rate-distortion
function for the source.
In general, the optimal distribution minimizing the rate
subject to both the distortion and leakage constraints depends
on the joint distribution of the measurement and inference
sequences. Modeling this relationship is, in general, not
straightforward or known a priori. Given this limitation, we
consider a simple linear inference model given by
Yk = αkXk + Zk, for all k, (10)
where Zk ∼ N (0, 1) is independent of Xk, and αk are
constants. In this paper, we limit our results to these models
to simplify our analysis and develop the intuition that can
eventually lead us to develop complete solutions for a more
general inference model. The following theorem captures our
result.
Theorem 3: The utility-privacy tradeoff for smart meter
measurements modeled as a Gaussian source with memory
with Yk = αkXk + Zk, for all k, is given by the leakage
function λ(D) which results from choosing the distribution
p (xˆn|xn) as the rate-distortion (without privacy) optimal
distribution.
Proof: The proof follows directly from noting that, for a
given jointly Gaussian distribution of the source and correlated
hidden sequence, pXnY n , the infimum in (8) and (9) is strictly
over the space of conditional distributions of the revealed
sequence given the original source sequence as a result of
the Markov chain relationship Y n − Xn − Xˆn. Expanding
the leakage as I(Y n; Xˆn) = h(Y n) − h(Y n|Xˆn), and using
the fact for correlated Gaussian processes, Yk = αkXk + Zk,
for all k, where {Zk} is a sequence independent of {Xk}
and αk is a constant for each k, one can show that the jointly
Gaussian distribution of Xn and Xˆn which minimizes (8) also
minimizes (9).
Remark 2: Theorem 3 simplifies the development of the
RDL region for Gaussian sources with memory for which the
rate-distortion function is known. For Gaussian sources with
memory the rate-distortion function is known and lends itself
to a straightforward practical implementation that we discuss
in the following section.
F. Rate-Distortion for Gaussian Sources with Memory
In general, the rate distortion functions for sources with
memory are not straightforward to compute. However, for
Gaussian sources, the rate-distortion function R(D) (without
the additional privacy constraint) is known and can be obtained
via a transformation of the correlated source sequence Xn to
its eigen-space in which the transformed sequence X˜n is a
collection of independent random variables with, in general,
different variances.
A standard approach to analyze correlated data is to project
the data to an orthogonal basis in which the leakage and distor-
tion constraints remain invariant. Since the data is random, we
project on to the principal axes of the n×n correlation matrix
GXX whose entry in the ith row and jth column is c (i− j)
defined in (1) for which the mean-square error (Euclidean
distance) function and the mutual information leakage are
invariant. Thus, while the constraints for the original and
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Fig. 1. The PSD of {Xk}. The area below the curve and the horizontal line
is equal to D.
transformed measurements are the same, the advantage of the
transformation is that the resulting measurements in any block
of length n are statistical independent.
We write SX (f) denote the unitary transformation of the
correlation matrix GXX , i.e., SX (f) is the power spectral
density (PSD) of the time series process {X (n)}, at discrete
frequencies, f = 0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1. We henceforth refer to the
transform domain as the spectral domain in keeping with the
literature. Similarly, let SY (ω) and SXY (ω) denote the PSDs
of the {Yk} and the {XkYk} processes where SXY (ω) is the
transform of the cross-correlation function cXY (m) of the
two sequences. Let φ denote the Lagrangian parameter for
the distortion constraint (4) in the rate minimization problem.
Explicitly denoting the dependence on the water-level φ, the
rate-distortion function Rφ (D) and the average distortion
function D (φ) are given by [16]
Rφ (D) =
∫ π
−π
max
(
0,
1
2
log
SX(ω)
φ
)
dω
2π
(11)
D (φ) =
∫ π
−π
min (SX(ω), φ)
dω
2π
. (12)
Note that the water-level φ is determined by the desired
average distortion D (φ) = D. Thus, R(D) for a Gaussian
source with memory can be expressed as an infinite sum of the
rate-distortion functions for independent Gaussian variables,
one for each angular frequency ω ∈ [−π, π]. The “water-
level” φ captures the average time-domain distortion constraint
across the spectrum such that the distortion for any ω is the
minimum of the water-level and the PSD. The privacy leakage
λ(D (φ)) is then the infinite sum of the information leakage
about {Yk} for each ω, and is given by
λ (D (φ)) =
∫ π
−π
1
2
log
(
SY (ω)
SXY (ω)g (ω) + SY (ω)
)
dω
2π
(13)
where g (ω) ≡ (min (SX(ω), φ) − 1) .
Remark 3: The transform domain “waterfilling” solution
suggests that in practice the time-series data can be filtered
for a desired level of fidelity (distortion) and privacy (leak-
age) using Fourier transforms. The privacy-preserving rate-
distortion optimal scheme thus reveals only those frequency
components with power above the water-level φ. Furthermore,
at every frequency only the portion of the signal energy which
is above the water level φ is preserved by the minimum-rate
sequence from which the source can be generated with an
average distortion D.
IV. ILLUSTRATION
The following example illustrates our results. We assume
that the private information to be hidden is the measurement
sequence itself, i.e., Yk = Xk, for all k. For the meter
measurements modeled as a stationary Gaussian time series
{Xk} , we choose Xk ∼ N (0, 1) for all k ∈ I, and an
autocorrelation function
cm = E[XkXk+m] =


1 m = 0,
0.3 m = ±1,
0.4 m = ±2,
0 otherwise.
The power spectral density PSD (frequency domain represen-
tation of the autocorrelation function) of this process is given
by
S(ω) =
∞∑
m=−∞
cm exp(imω) = 1+0.6 cos(ω)+0.8 cos(2ω),
− π ≤ ω ≤ π. (14)
In order to obtain the rate-distortion function Rφ(D) for this
source, for a given D we have to find the water-level φ
satisfying (12).
Figure 1 shows the PSD function cm. Determining φ is
equivalent to determining the height of the horizontal line,
such that the area below the curve and the line equals D as
given by (12). Having determined φ, Rφ(D) is then given by
(11). S(ω) takes its minimum value at ω0 = arccos(−316 ) ≃
1.7594. Thus, for D ≤ S(ω0) ≃ 0.1437, φ = D such that
R(D) = 14π
∫ π
−π
log (S(ω)/D) dω,which is the same as the
rate-distortion function for a Gaussian source with variance
σ˜2 = 12π
∫ π
−π
logS(ω)dω, i.e., when the distortion falls below
a certain threshold, the rate required to reproduce the source
at the receiver with the desired fidelity is the same as that of
a memoryless Gaussian source. Finally, since we have chosen
to hide the original meter measurements, for this problem, the
privacy leakage is the same as the rate distortion. The resulting
tradeoff between is shown in Fig. 2.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The theoretical framework that we have developed here
allows us to precisely quantify the utility-privacy tradeoff
problem in smart meter data. Given a series of smart meter
measurements X , we reveal a perturbation Xˆ that allows us
to guarantee a measure of both privacy in X and utility in Xˆ .
The privacy guarantee comes from the bound on information
leakage while the utility guarantee comes from the upper
bound on the MSE distance between X and Xˆ .
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
D
R
(D
)
Fig. 2. Plot of Rφ(D) = λφ(D) vs. average distortion D.
Our model of privacy, namely information leakage, does not
depend on any assumptions about the inference mechanism
(i.e. the data mining algorithms); instead it presents the least
possible (on average) guarantee of information leakage about
X , while the utility is preserved in an application-agnostic
manner. Our framework is also agnostic about how the per-
turbation is achieved; for example it can be achieved using a
filter such as a battery or by adding noise.
Modeling a smart meter as a Gaussian source with memory
and extending known results from rate distortion theory, we
show that a utility-privacy tradeoff framework can be con-
structed that gives tight bounds on the amount of privacy that
can be achieved for a given level of utility and vice-versa.
The critical parameter of choice in the utility-privacy tradeoff
is the water level φ, which in turn depends on the bound
on the distortion that is acceptable. The choice of φ dictates
the extent to which the original signal (meter measurements)
can be distorted and the rate Rφ (D) is the maximum data
precision allowed for which information leakage is at most
λ(D (φ)). In a practical context, the choice of φ is dictated by
the choice of the privacy-utility tradeoff operating point, which
in turn has to be negotiated between the energy provider and
consumer.
Our distortion model can be viewed as a filter on the load
signal X – it filters out all frequencies that have power below
a certain threshold (determined directly by φ). This filter is
novel and comes directly as a result of our model. From
a practical point of view, it makes sense in the following
way. From the appliance signature chart in [1], frequency
components that have low power typically correspond to
fluctuations in energy consumption that are short-lived, which
in turn are caused by appliances such as kettles and television
sets and transmit the bulk of information about underlying
human behavior. Frequency components that have high power
tend to caused by continuously running appliances such as
air conditioning units and refrigerators that reveal much less
about human behavior. Suppressing low power components
would thus reduce or eliminate the components of the signal
that are likely to be most revealing about human behavior
and thus match our intuition on privacy protection in smart
meter data. At the same time, our utility constraints guarantee
that most of the useful energy consumption information is
retained in the revealed load data. This holds out hope that we
can reveal significant energy consumption information while
at the same time protecting significant personal information
in a tunable tradeoff. This would be an interesting avenue
for further exploration. Another interesting avenue to explore
would be to apply and demonstrate the power of these concepts
in a practical context.
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